Can Andrzej Duda lose the Polish presidential election? by Szczerbiak, Aleks
Can Andrzej Duda lose the Polish presidential election?
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/105024/
Version: Published Version
Online resource:
Szczerbiak, Aleks (2020) Can Andrzej Duda lose the Polish presidential election? 
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) blog (11 Mar 2020). Blog Entry. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Can	Andrzej	Duda	lose	the	Polish	presidential
election?
Poland	will	hold	a	presidential	election	on	10	May,	with	a	second	round	of	voting	scheduled	for	two
weeks	later	if	no	candidate	wins	50%	of	the	vote.	Aleks	Szczerbiak	explains	that	incumbent	President
Andrzej	Duda	will	start	as	favourite,	boosted	by	his	credibility	in	helping	deliver	the	government’s
social	spending	and	welfare	policies,	and	his	strong	base	in	small-town,	provincial	Poland.	But	his
fortunes	are	linked	to	the	ruling	party’s	popularity	and,	given	how	polarised	and	evenly	divided	the
Polish	political	scene	is,	the	election	promises	to	be	closely	fought	and	unpredictable.
Notwithstanding	the	as-yet-unpredictable	impact	of	the	Coronavirus	epidemic,	over	the	next	couple	of	months
Polish	politics	will	be	dominated	by	the	crucially	important	10	May	presidential	election,	with	a	second	round	run-off
held	a	fortnight	later	between	the	two	leading	candidates	if	neither	secures	more	than	50%	of	the	vote.	The	election
is	likely	to	determine	the	shape	of	the	political	scene	until	the	next	parliamentary	poll	scheduled	for	autumn	2023.
A	victory	for	incumbent	Andrzej	Duda	–	who	is	supported	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	grouping,
Poland’s	ruling	party	since	autumn	2015	–	would	give	the	government	a	three-year	run	without	any	national
elections	to	continue	implementing	its	programme	of	radical	state	reconstruction.	However,	given	that	the	party
lacks	the	three-fifths	legislative	majority	required	to	over-turn	a	presidential	veto,	Duda’s	defeat	would	be	a	disaster
for	Law	and	Justice,	seriously	hampering	its	ability	to	govern	effectively	and	possibly	precipitating	an	early
parliamentary	election.
Most	commentators	assumed	Duda	would	win	easily	given	his	high	levels	of	popularity.	A	February	survey
conducted	by	the	CBOS	polling	agency	found	that	he	enjoyed	a	60%	approval	rating,	the	highest	of	any	Polish
politician,	while	57%	were	satisfied	with	the	way	that	he	was	performing	his	duties	(although	both	of	these	have
fallen	in	recent	months).	The	‘Ewybory’	website	that	aggregates	voting	intention	surveys	found	Duda	averaging
42%	support,	nearly	twenty	points	ahead	of	his	nearest	rival	Małgorzata	Kidawa-Blońska,	the	candidate	of	the
liberal-centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	Poland’s	ruling	party	between	2007-15	and	currently	the	main	opposition
grouping.	Polls	also	suggest	that	Duda	would	defeat	all	potential	challengers	in	a	second	round	run-off,	albeit	by	a
much	narrower	margin.
However,	five	years	ago	Duda’s	Civic	Platform-backed	predecessor	Bronisław	Komorowski	enjoyed	even	higher
approval	ratings	but	failed	to	secure	re-election.	Moreover,	last	autumn’s	parliamentary	election	–	when	Law	and
Justice	retained	its	overall	majority	but	lost	control	of	the	Senate,	Poland’s	less	powerful	second	chamber	–	showed
how	polarised	and	evenly	balanced	support	for	the	government	and	opposition	is,	with	many	voters	determined	to
use	any	opportunity	to	block	the	ruling	party.	The	presidential	poll	will,	therefore,	be	a	much	greater	challenge	for
Duda	than	previously	anticipated.
Duda’s	assets
One	of	Duda’s	strengths	is	that	he	is	an	energetic	and	dynamic	campaigner	who	can	connect	with	ordinary	Poles
and	has	made	great	efforts	to	reach	out	to	the	often-forgotten	parts	of	small-town,	provincial	Poland	that	constitute
Law	and	Justice’s	electoral	heartland.	Earlier	this	year,	he	fulfilled	his	pledge	to	become	the	first	President	to	visit
every	one	of	Poland’s	380	administrative	counties	during	his	term	of	office.
This	vision	of	the	presidency,	showing	as	much	respect	to	citizens	living	in	smaller	towns	and	rural	areas	as	those
in	larger	urban	agglomerations,	provided	Duda	with	enormous	political	capital	going	into	the	campaign.	It	dovetails
with	Law	and	Justice’s	broader	political	project	which	some	commentators	term	the	‘redistribution	of	prestige’,
whereby	ordinary	Poles	who	previously	felt	themselves	to	be	second-class	citizens	started	to	regain	a	sense	of
dignity	and	self-respect.
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Duda’s	core	appeal	is	as	the	guarantor	of	the	Law	and	Justice	government’s	programme	of	so-called	‘good	change’
(dobra	zmiana).	This	has	involved	hugely	expanding	social	spending	and	welfare	policies	for	families	and	low-
income	households	who	felt	frustrated	that	they	had	not	shared	sufficiently	in	Poland’s	post-communist
transformation,	while	simultaneously	maintaining	strong	economic	growth	and	reducing	the	state	budget	deficit.	His
supporters	also	point	to	Duda’s	apparent	foreign	and	defence	policy	successes,	particularly	in	developing	closer
ties	with	the	United	States.
Andrzej	Duda,	Credit:	NATO	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Although	these	areas	lie	primarily	within	the	government’s	domain,	the	Constitution	gives	the	President	an	informal
oversight	and	co-ordinating	role,	and	he	is	also	commander-in-chief	of	the	armed	forces.	Law	and	Justice	argues
that	Duda	played	a	key	role	in	strengthening	Poland’s	defence	infrastructure	through	the	additional	deployment	of
US	and	NATO	troops	on	Polish	territory.	They	also	credit	him	with	the	lifting	of	the	requirement	for	Poles	visiting	the
United	States	to	obtain	visas,	which	Polish	governments	have	long	campaigned	for.
Duda	is	fortunate	that	Kidawa-Błońska	–	who,	unless	there	is	a	major	change	in	the	campaign	dynamics,	is	very
likely	to	be	his	second	round	challenger	–	appears	to	be	a	relatively	weak	opponent.	She	was	originally	chosen	as
Civic	Platform’s	prime	ministerial	candidate	in	last	autumn’s	parliamentary	election	because	of	her	reputation	as	an
emollient	and	conciliatory	political	figure.	But	Kidawa-Błońska’s	critics	argue	that	she	lacks	any	significant
achievements	in	spite	of	her	many	years	in	politics	and	is	an	unimpressive	public	speaker	with	untested	debating
skills.
The	election	campaign	is	likely	to	be	a	brutal	affair	but	if	she	tries	to	adopt	a	more	combative	approach	this	could
undermine	her	image	as	the	candidate	of	societal	dialogue	and	reconciliation.	Moreover,	although	Kidawa-Błońska
undoubtedly	comes	across	as	sophisticated	and	urbane,	critics	say	that	she	also	embodies	the	aloof	urban	liberal
elites	who,	Law	and	Justice	claims,	look	down	upon	the	inhabitants	of	small-town	provincial	Poland.	More	broadly,
Law	and	Justice	accuse	Kidawa-Błońska	of	lacking	an	alternative	programmatic	vision,	arguing	that	she	would
simply	use	the	presidency	to	sabotage	the	government.
Another	plebiscite	on	Law	and	Justice?
However,	Duda	will	almost	certainly	not	win	in	the	first	round	and,	given	how	divided	and	polarised	the	political
scene	is,	no	matter	how	weak	the	opposition	candidate	is,	the	second	round	is	likely	to	be	extremely	closely	fought
and	unpredictable.	Civic	Platform	knows	that	Kidawa-Błońska	is	not	an	ideal	candidate,	but	political	marketing
specialists	are	already	working	hard	to	minimise	her	weaknesses	as	a	communicator.
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Ironically,	although	she	has	been	part	of	the	party	establishment	for	many	years,	Kidawa-Błońska’s	lack	of	any	real
governing	experience	means	that	she	is	not	as	clearly	identified	in	the	public	mind	with	the	previous,	discredited
Civic	Platform-led	administrations.	Moreover,	the	opposition	retains	several	important	political	assets,	including
substantial	financial	resources	and	the	backing	of	much	of	the	privately-owned	media,	as	well	as	significant
influence	within,	and	widespread	support	from,	Poland’s	cultural,	legal	and	business	elites.
Duda’s	biggest	weakness	is	his	vulnerability	to	the	accusation	that	throughout	his	presidency	he	has	been
marginalised	in	key	state	policy	decisions	and	simply	acted	as	the	government’s	‘notary’.	In	many	ways	this	is	not
surprising	as	Duda	broadly	agrees	with	much	of	Law	and	Justice’s	critique	of	the	alleged	dysfunctionality	of	the
post-communist	state	and	its	core	institutions;	his	disagreements	are	generally	over	how	radical	reforms	should	be
and	the	best	means	of	achieving	them.	But	Duda	cannot	simply	rely	on	the	support	of	the	Law	and	Justice	core
electorate	and	to	attract	more	than	50%	of	the	votes	needs	to	craft	a	broader	appeal.
Except	for	one	occasion	–	in	July	2017,	when	he	vetoed	two	of	the	government’s	flagship	judicial	reform	laws	(and
even	then	the	revised	versions	that	he	proposed	were	very	close	to	the	originals)	–	Duda	has	not	really	made	any
serious	attempts	to	carve	out	a	role	for	himself	as	an	independent	political	actor	able	to	transcend	the	government-
opposition	divide.	More	broadly,	critics	argue	that	his	presidency	lacks	a	clear	defining	concept	and	he	has	been
ineffective	in	both	carrying	forward	any	independent	political	initiatives	and	developing	a	strong	intellectual	and
political	support	base,	preferring	instead	to	surround	himself	with	technocrats.
Indeed,	the	opposition’s	strategy	is	to	turn	the	election	into	a	plebiscite	on	the	Law	and	Justice	government	by	tying
Duda	as	closely	as	they	can	to	the	ruling	party.	Although	Law	and	Justice	continues	to	enjoy	a	clear	opinion	poll
lead,	the	government	is	feeling	the	strain	of	having	been	in	office	for	four-and-a-half	years.	A	slowdown	in	the
economy	has	put	pressure	on	the	state	budget	making	it	difficult	for	Law	and	Justice	to	offer	any	substantial	new
social	spending	and	welfare	pledges,	the	key	to	mobilising	its	supporters	in	previous	elections.	In	January,	inflation
hit	4.4%,	the	highest	rate	for	eight	years,	which,	apart	from	impacting	upon	living	standards	more	generally,	will
have	eaten	into	the	income	boost	which	Poles	received	from	the	government’s	welfare	payments	and	fiscal
transfers;	and	recently	approved	new	taxes	will	also	start	to	hit	Polish	consumers.
While	Duda’s	personal	popularity	remains	higher	than	that	of	the	ruling	party,	a	key	group	of	voters	who	are
positively	inclined	towards	him	but	do	not	necessarily	support	Law	and	Justice	may	use	the	election	to	articulate
that	discontent.	So,	he	needs	to	find	a	way	of	undermining	this	over-arching	plebiscitary	logic.	In	2015,	Duda	ran	as
an	insurgent	opposition	candidate	of	change	but,	as	an	incumbent	defending	a	record,	it	will	be	difficult	for	him	to
replicate	the	energy	and	dynamism	of	that	campaign.	Nonetheless,	if	he	is	to	avoid	the	trap	that	Komorowski	fell
into	five	years	ago,	Duda	will	have	to	once-again	offer	a	fresh	reform	agenda	rather	than	simply	standing	as	the
candidate	of	the	governing	status	quo.
Moreover,	Duda’s	re-election	campaign	got	off	to	a	shaky	start	when	the	opposition	called	upon	him	to	veto	a
government-sponsored	law	providing	a	2	billion	złoties	subsidy	to	compensate	Polish	state	broadcasters	for
shortfalls	in	licence	fee	payments,	and	instead	spend	the	money	on	improving	cancer	treatment.	Civic	Platform
pounced	on	an	apparently	obscene	gesture	by	Law	and	Justice	deputy	Joanna	Lichocka	(for	which	she	later
apologised)	during	the	parliamentary	debate	on	the	draft	law,	turning	it	into	viral	social	media	meme	which	they	said
symbolised	the	ruling	party’s	arrogance	and	contempt	for	cancer	patients.
They	accused	Law	and	Justice	of	depriving	the	health	service	of	funds	to	subsidise	a	government	propaganda	tool
(the	ruling	party	argues	that	previous	administrations	also	used	Polish	state	TV	in	this	way	and	that	its	current
political	stance	simply	brings	pluralism	and	balance	to	a	media	landscape	otherwise	dominated	by	the	party’s
opponents).	In	the	event,	Duda	approved	the	law	but	not	before	forcing	the	resignation	of	Polish	TVs	controversial
president	Jacek	Kurski,	and	then	announced	a	separate,	substantial	increase	in	health	service	funding.
Underlying	factors	still	working	for	Duda?
Polish	presidential	elections	often	see	very	rapid	shifts	in	public	support	in	a	short	space	of	time	and	Duda’s	room
for	manoeuvre	is	extremely	tight.	The	biggest	threat	to	him	could	be	the	de-mobilisation	of	his	disproportionately
small-town	and	rural	electorate,	which	is	generally	much	less	interested	in	politics,	while	the	government’s
opponents	will	be	highly	motivated	to	turnout,	especially	in	the	second	round.
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Nonetheless,	there	are	still	a	number	of	important	underlying	factors	working	in	Duda’s	favour,	notably	his	credibility
in	helping	to	deliver	Law	and	Justice’s	very	popular	social	spending	and	welfare	policies	while	the	economy
remains	fairly	buoyant.	Duda	has	also	developed	his	own	distinctive	presidential	style	based	on	highly	personal
contacts	with	the	electorate.	A	key	difference	with	his	predecessor	is	that	Duda	faced	a	sustained	attack	throughout
his	presidency	from	the	still-influential	opposition-supporting	private	media,	so	his	base	of	support	should	be	more
solid.
For	sure,	Civic	Platform	has	certainly	become	more	tactically	astute	and	effective	at	political	marketing	on	issues
such	as	health	service	funding,	and	a	below-expectations	first	round	result	for	Duda	could	change	the	campaign
dynamics.	But	Kidawa-Błońska	is	still	trying	to	mobilise	voters	primarily	on	the	basis	of	opposition	to	the
government	and	has	not	articulated	a	convincing	alternative	vision	of	the	presidency	that	could	decisively	rally
voters	to	her	cause	in	a	tight	second	round	run-off.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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